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1Abstract
We investigate the relative signi￿cance of diﬀerences in cognitive skills and discrimina-
tion in explaining racial/ethnic wage gaps. We show that cognitive test scores taken
prior to entering the labor market are in￿uenced by schooling. Adjusting the scores for
racial/ethnic diﬀerences in education at the time the test is taken reduces their role in
accounting for the wage gaps. We also consider evidence on parental and child expec-
tations about education and on stereotype-threat eﬀects. We ￿nd both factors to be
implausible alternative explanations for the gaps we observe. We argue that policies
need to address the sources of early skill gaps and to seek to in￿uence the more mal-
leable behavioral abilities in addition to their cognitive counterparts. Such policies are
f a rm o r el i k e l yt ob ee ﬀective in promoting racial and ethnic equality for most groups
than are additional civil rights and aﬃrmative action policies targeted at the workplace.
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2I Introduction
I ti sw e l ld o c u m e n t e dt h a tc i v i lr i g h t sp o l i c yd i r e c t e dt o w a r dt h eS o u t hr a i s e db l a c ke c o n o m i cs t a t u s
in the 1960s and 1970s.1 Yet substantial gaps remain in the market wages of African-American
males and females compared to those of white males and females.2 T h e r ea r es i z a b l ew a g eg a p sf o r
Hispanics as well.
Columns I of Table 1 report, for various ages, the mean hourly log wage gaps for a cohort of young
black and young Hispanic males and females.3 The reported gaps are not adjusted for diﬀerences
in schooling, ability, or other market productivity traits. The table shows that, on average, black
males earn 25% lower wages than white males in 1990. Hispanic males earn 17.4% lower wages in
the same year. The gaps increase for males as the cohort ages. For women, there are smaller gaps
for blacks and virtually no gap at all for Hispanic women, and the gaps for women show no clear
trend with age.4 Joseph Altonji and Rebecca Blank5 report similar patterns using data from the
Current Population Survey (CPS).
These gaps are consistent with claims of pervasive labor market discrimination against minori-
ties. Minority workers with the same ability and training as white workers may be receiving lower
wages. There is, however, another equally plausible explanation consistent with the same evidence.
Minorities may bring less skill and ability to the market. Although there may be discrimination
or disparity in the development of these valuable skills, the skills may be rewarded equally across
all demographic groups in the labor market. Clearly, a variety of intermediate explanations that
combine both hypotheses are consistent with the data just presented.
The two polar interpretations of market wage gaps have profoundly diﬀerent policy implications.
If persons of identical skill are treated diﬀe r e n t l yi nt h el a b o rm a r k e to nt h eb a s i so fr a c eo re t h n i c i t y ,
a more vigorous enforcement of civil rights and aﬃrmative action in the marketplace would appear
1John J. Donohue and James J. Heckman, Continuous versus Episodic Change: The Impact of Civil Rights Policy
on the Economic Status of Blacks, 29 J. Econ. Lit. 1603 (1991).
2The literature on African-American economic progress in the twentieth century is surveyed in James J. Heck-
man and Petra Todd, Understanding the Contribution of Legislation, Social Activism, Markets and Choice to the
Economic Progress of African Americans in the Twentieth Century (Unpublished manuscript. Chicago: American
Bar Foundation, 2001).
3These gaps are for a cohort of young persons age 26-28 in 1990 from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth
of 1979, or NLSY79. They are followed for 10 years until they reach age 36-38 in 2000.
4However, the magnitudes (but not the direction) of the female gaps are less reliably determined, at least for
black women. Derek Neal (The Measured Black-White Wage Gap among Women is Too Small, 112 J. Pol. Econ. S1
(2004).) shows that racial wage gaps for black women are underestimated by these types of regressions since they do
not control for selective labor force participation. This same line of reasoning is likely to hold for Hispanic women.
5Joseph Altonji and Rebecca Blank, Gender and Race in the Labor Markets, in Handbook of Labor Economics,
Vol. 3C (Orley Ashenfelter and David Card, eds. 1999).
3to be warranted. On the other hand, if the gaps are solely due to unmeasured abilities and skills
that people bring to the labor market, then a redirection of policy towards fostering skills should
be emphasized as opposed to a policy of ferreting out discrimination in the workplace.
Derek Neal and William Johnson6 shed light on the relative empirical importance of market
discrimination and skill disparity in accounting for wage gaps by race. Controlling for scholastic
ability measured in the mid-teenage years, they substantially reduce but do not fully eliminate
wage gaps for black males in 1990-1991 data. They more than eliminate the gaps for black females.
Columns II in Table 1 show our version of the estimates reported in the Neal-Johnson study,
expanded to cover additional years.7 For black males, controlling for an early measure of ability
cuts the black-white wage gap in 1990 by 76 percent. For Hispanic males, controlling for ability
essentially eliminates the wage gap with whites. For women the results are even more striking. Wage
gaps are actually reversed, and controlling for ability produces higher wages for minority females.
This evidence suggests that the endowments people bring to the labor market play a substantial
role in accounting for minority wage gaps.
This paper critically examines the Neal-Johnson argument and brings fresh evidence to bear
on it. With some important quali￿cations, our analysis supports their conclusion that factors
determined outside of the market play the major role in accounting for minority/majority wage
diﬀerentials in modern labor markets.
In producing the wage gaps shown in Table 1, we follow a practice suggested by Neal and Johnson
and do not adjust for the eﬀects of racial and economic diﬀerences in schooling, occupational choice,
or work experience on wages. Racial and ethnic diﬀerences in these factors may re￿ect responses
to labor market discrimination and should not be controlled for in regressions estimating the ￿full
eﬀect￿ of race on wages through all channels since doing so may spuriously reduce estimated wage
gaps by introducing a proxy for discrimination into the control variables. While the motivation for
their procedure is clear, their qualitative claim is false. Including schooling in a wage regression
raises estimated wage gaps and produces more evidence of racial disparity. Gaps ￿xing and not
￿xing schooling are both of interest, and answer diﬀerent questions.
Gaps in measured ability by ethnicity and race are substantial. Figure 1 plots the ability
6Derek Neal and William Johnson, The Role of Premarket Factors in Black-White Wage Diﬀerences, 104 J. Pol.
Econ. 869 (1996).
7We use a sample very similar to the one used in their study. It includes individuals born only in 1962-1964.
This exclusion is designed to alleviate the eﬀects of diﬀerential schooling at the test date on test performance and to
ensure that the AFQT test is taken before the individuals enter the labor market, so that it is more likely to be a
premarket factor.
4distribution as measured by age-corrected AFQT8 for males and females in the NLSY79.9 As noted
by Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray,10 ability gaps are a major factor in accounting for a
variety of racial and ethnic disparities in socioeconomic outcomes. Stephen Cameron and James
Heckman11 show that controlling for ability, blacks and Hispanics are more likely to enter college
than are whites.12
Neal and Johnson13 argue that ability measured in the teenage years is a ￿premarket￿ factor,
m e a n i n gt h a ti ti sn o ta ﬀected by expectations or actual experiences of discrimination in the labor
market. They oﬀer no explicit criterion for determining which factors are ￿premarket￿ and which
are not.
Schooling aﬀects test scores,14 and minority schooling is lower than white schooling, both gen-
erally and in the samples used by Neal and Johnson. Their test score is contaminated by schooling
attainment at the date of the test. Adjusting their test score for this factor, adjusted wage gaps
increase.
The gaps in ability evident in Figure 1 stem in part from lower schooling by minorities at the time
of the test and may also arise from lowered academic eﬀort in anticipation of future discrimination
in the labor market. If skills are not rewarded fairly, the incentive to acquire them is diminished
for those subject to prejudicial treatment. Discrimination in the labor market might not only sap
the incentives of children and young adults to acquire skills and abilities, but it may also in￿uence
the eﬀorts they exert in raising their own oﬀspring. This means that even after adjusting their
test score for schooling, measured ability may not be a true premarket factor. Neal and Johnson15
8Age-corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the
test dummy variables. AFQT is a subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by the military for enlistment screening
and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics
knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning ASVAB tests.
9In our web appendix at http://jenni.uchicago.edu/JLE, we show that the same patterns emerge when we divide
the sample by gender.
10Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray, The Bell Curve (1994).
11Stephen Cameron and James J. Heckman, The Dynamics of Educational Attainment for Blacks, Whites and
Hispanics, 109 J. Pol. Econ. 455 (2001).
12Sergio Urzua, The Educational White-Black Gap: Evidence on Years of Schooling, (Working paper, Univ.
Chicago, Dept. Econ. 2003) shows that this eﬀect arises from greater minority enrollment in two-year colleges.
Controlling for ability, whites are more likely to attend and graduate from four year colleges. Using the Current
Population Survey, Sandra E. Black and Amir Su￿, Who Goes to College? Diﬀerential Enrollment by Race and
Family Background, (Working paper no. w9310, NBER 2002) ￿nd that equating the family background of blacks
and whites eliminates the black-white gap in schooling only at the bottom of the family background distribution.
Furthermore, the gaps are eliminated in the 1980s, but not in the 1990s.
13S e en o t e6supra.
14See Karsten Hansen, James J. Heckman and Kathleen Mullen, The Eﬀect of Schooling and Ability on Achieve-
ment Test Scores, 121 J. Econometrics 39 (2004).
15S e en o t e6supra.
5mention this quali￿cation in their original paper and their critics have subsequently reiterated it.
The gaps in ability may also be a consequence of adverse environments. Even if all wage gaps are
due to ability, uncontaminated by expectations of market discrimination, the appropriate policy for
eliminating ability gaps is not apparent from Table 1. Should policies focus on early ages through
enriched Head Start programs or on improving schooling quality and reducing school dropout and
repetition rates that plague minority children at later ages?
This paper demonstrates that ability gaps open up very early. Minorities enter school with
substantially lower measured ability than whites. The black-white ability gap widens as the children
get older and obtain more schooling, but the contribution of formal education to the widening of
the gap is small when compared to the size of the initial gap. There is a much smaller widening of
the Hispanic-white ability gap with schooling.
Our evidence and that of Babur de los Santos, James J. Heckman, and Maria Isabel Larenas,16
suggests that school-based policies are unlikely to have substantial eﬀects on eliminating minority
ability gaps. Factors that operate early in the life cycle of the child are likely to have the greatest
impact on ability.
The early emergence of ability gaps indicates that child expectations can play only a limited role
in accounting for ability gaps since very young children are unlikely to have formed expectations
about labor market discrimination and to take decisions based on those expectations. However,
parental expectations of future discrimination may still play a role in shaping child outcomes.
The early emergence of measured ability diﬀerentials also casts doubt on the empirical impor-
tance of the ￿stereotype threat￿17 as a major factor contributing to black-white test score diﬀeren-
tials. The literature on this topic claims that black college students at selective colleges perform
worse on tests when they are told that the tests may be used to con￿rm stereotypes about black-
white ability diﬀerentials. The empirical importance of this eﬀect is in dispute in the psychology
literature.18
The children in our data are tested at very young ages and are unlikely to be aware of stereotypes
about minority inferiority or be aﬀected by the stereotype threat which has only been empirically
established for students at elite colleges. In addition, large gaps in tests are also evident for His-
16Babur I. de los Santos, James J. Heckman and Maria-Isabel Larenas, Explaining the Gap in Achievement Test
Scores for Blacks, Hispanics and Whites, (Working paper Univ. Chicago Dept. Econ. 2004).
17See Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson, Stereotype Threat and the Test Performance of Academically Successful
African Americans, in The Black-White Test Score Gap 401 (Christopher Jenks and Meredith Phillips, eds. 1998).
18See Paul Sackett, Chaitra Hardison and Michael Cullen, On Interpreting Stereotype Threat as Accounting for
African American-White Diﬀerences in Cognitive Tests 59 Am. Psychologist 7 (2004).
6panics, a group for whom the stereotype threat has not been documented. The stereotype threat
literature claims that measured test scores for minorities understate their true ability. Unless the
eﬀect is uniform across ability levels, incremental ability should be rewarded diﬀerently between
blacks and whites. We ￿nd no evidence of such an eﬀect.
Adjusting for the schooling attainment of minorities at the time that they take tests provides
an empirically important quali￿cation to the Neal and Johnson study.19 An extra year of schooling
has a greater impact on test scores for whites and Hispanics than for blacks. Adjusting the test
score for schooling disparity at the date of the test leaves more room for interpreting wage gaps as
arising from labor market discrimination.
This ￿nding does not necessarily overturn the conclusions of the Neal-Johnson analysis. At
issue is the source of the gap in schooling attainment at the date of the test. The Neal-Johnson
￿pre-market￿ factors are a composite of ability and schooling, and are likely to re￿ect both the life
cycle experiences and the expectations of the child. To the extent that they re￿ect expectations
of discrimination as embodied in schooling that aﬀects test scores, the scores are contaminated by
market discrimination and are not truly premarket factors. An open question is how much of the
gap in schooling is due to expectations about future discrimination.
The evidence from data on parents￿ and children￿s expectations tells a mixed story. Minority
child and parent expectations about the children￿s schooling prospects are as optimistic at ages 16-
17 as counterpart white expectations, although actual schooling outcomes of whites and minorities
are dramatically diﬀerent. Diﬀerential expectations at these ages cannot explain the gaps in ability
evident in Figure 1.
For children age 14 and below, parent and child expectations about schooling are much lower
for blacks than for whites, though only slightly lower for Hispanics than for whites. All groups are
still rather optimistic in light of subsequent schooling attendance and performance. At these ages,
diﬀerences in expectations across groups may lead to diﬀerential investments in skill formation.
While lower expectations may be a consequence of perceived labor market discrimination, they may
also re￿ect child and parental perception of the lower endowments possessed by minorities, so this
evidence is not decisive.
A focus on cognitive skill gaps, while traditional,20 misses important noncognitive components
of social and economic success. We show that noncognitive (behavioral) gaps also open up early.
19S e en o t e6supra.
20See for example, Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test Score Gap (1998).
7Previous work shows that they play an important role in accounting for market wages. Policies
that focus solely on improving cognitive skills miss an important and promising determinant of
socioeconomic success and disparity that can be aﬀected by policy.21
The rest of the paper proceeds in the following way. Section II presents evidence on the evolution
of test score gaps over the life cycle of the child. Section III discusses the evidence on the stereotype
threat. Section IV presents our evidence on how adjusting for schooling at the date of the test aﬀects
the conclusions of the Neal-Johnson analysis, and how schooling aﬀects test scores diﬀerentially for
minorities. Section V discusses our evidence on child and parental expectations. Section VI presents
evidence on noncognitive skills that parallels the analysis of Section II. Section VII concludes.
II Minority-White Diﬀerences in Early Test Scores and
Early Environments
This section summarizes evidence from the literature and presents original empirical work that
demonstrates that minority-white cognitive skill gaps emerge early and persist through childhood
and the adolescent years. Christopher Jencks and Meredith Phillips22 and Greg Duncan and Jeanne
Brooks-Gunn23 document that the black-white test score gap is large for 3 and 4 year old children.
Using the Children of the NLSY79 (CNLSY) survey, a sample of children of the mothers in the 1979
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth data, a variety of studies show that even after controlling for
many variables like individual, family and neighborhood characteristics, the black-white test score
gap is still sizable.24,25 These studies also document that there are large black-white diﬀerences
in family environments. Ronald Ferguson26 summarizes this literature and presents evidence that
black children come from much poorer and less educated families than white children, and they are
21See Pedro Carneiro and James J. Heckman, Human Capital Policy, in Inequality in America: What Role for
Human Capital Policies? 77 (James Heckman and Alan Krueger, eds. 2003).
22S e en o t e2 0supra.
23Greg Duncan and Jeanne Brooks-Gunn, Consequences of Growing Up Poor (1997).
24In a similar study based on the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS), Roland Fryer and Steven Levitt
(Understanding the Black-White Test Score Gap in the First Two Years of School, 86 Rev. Econ. Stat. 447, 2004)
eliminate the black-white test score gap in math and reading for children at the time they are entering kindergarten,
although not in subsequent years. However, the raw test score gaps at ages 3 and 4 are much smaller in ECLS than
in CNLSY and other data sets that have been used to study this issue and so their results are anomalous in the
context of a larger literature.
25For a description of CNLSY and NLSY79 see Bureau of Labor Statistics, NLS Handbook 2001 (2001).
26Ronald Ferguson, Why America￿s Black-White School Achievement Gap Persists, (Unpublished manuscript,
Harvard Univ., 2002).
8also more likely to grow up in single parent households. Studies summarized by Ferguson27 ￿nd that
the achievement gap is high even for blacks and whites attending high quality suburban schools.28
The common ￿nding across these studies is that the black-white gap in test scores is large and
that it persists even after one controls for family background variables. Children of diﬀerent racial
and ethnic groups grow up in strikingly diﬀerent environments.29 Even after accounting for these
environmental factors in a correlational sense, substantial test score gaps remain. Furthermore,
these gaps tend to widen with age and schooling: black children show lower measured ability
growth with schooling or age than white children.
This paper presents additional evidence from the children of the persons interviewed in the
CNLSY. We have also examined the Early Childhood Longitudinal Survey (ECLS) analyzed by
Ferguson30 and Roland Fryer and Steven Levitt31 and also the Children of the Panel Study of
Income Dynamics (CPSID) and ￿nd similar patterns. We broaden previous analyses to include
Hispanic-white diﬀerentials. Figure 2 shows the average percentile PIAT Math32 scores for males
in diﬀerent age groups by race. Results for females show the same patterns and are available in our
web appendix.33 For brevity, in this paper we only focus on the male results. Racial and ethnic
test score gaps are found as early as ages 5 and 6 (the earliest ages at which we can measure math
scores in CNLSY data).34 On average, black 5- and 6-year old boys are almost 18 percentile points
below white 5- and 6-year old boys (That is, if the average white is at the 50th percentile of the
test score distribution, the average black is at the 32nd percentile of this distribution). The gap is a
bit smaller￿16 percent￿but still substantial for Hispanics. These ￿ndings are duplicated for many
other test scores and in other data sets, and are not altered if we use median test scores instead of
means. Furthermore, as shown in Figure 3, even when we use a test taken at earlier ages, racial
gaps in test scores can be found at ages 1 and 2.35 In general, test score gaps emerge early and
27Ronald Ferguson, What Doesn￿t Meet the Eye: Understanding and Addressing Racial Disparities in High Achiev-
ing Suburban Schools, (Special Edition, Policy Issues Report, 2002).
28This is commonly referred to as the ￿Shaker Heights study,￿ although it analyzed many other similar neighbor-
hoods.
29See also the discussion in David J. Armor, Maximizing Intelligence (2003).
30S e en o t e2 6supra.
31S e en o t e2 4supra.
32The PIAT Math is the abbreviation for Peabody Individual Achievement Test in Mathematics. This test measures
the child￿s attainment in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. It consists of 84 multiple choice questions
of increasing diﬃculty, beginning with recognizing numerals and progressing to geometry and trigonometry.
33S e en o t e9supra.
34Instead of using raw scores or standardized scores we choose to use ranks, or percentiles, since test score scales
have no intrinsic meaning. Our results are not sensitive to this procedure.
35This is not always the case for women, as shown in the web appendix (see note 9 supra). Parts of the Body
Test attempts to measure the young child￿s receptive vocabulary knowledge of orally presented words as a means of
9persist through adulthood.
For brevity, we focus on means and medians in this paper. However, Figures 1 and 4 illustrate
that there is considerable overlap in the distribution of test scores across groups in recent genera-
tions. Many black and Hispanic children at ages 5 and 6 score higher on a math test score than the
average white child. Statements that we make about medians or means do not apply to all persons
in these distributions.
Figure 2 shows that the black-white percentile PIAT Math score gap widens with age. By ages
13 to 14, the average black is ranked more than 22 percentiles below the average white. In fact,
these gaps persist through adulthood. At 13 to 14, Hispanic boys are almost 16 points below the
average white.
When blacks and Hispanics enter the labor market, on average they have a much poorer set
of cognitive skills than whites. Thus it is not surprising that their average labor market outcomes
are so much worse. Furthermore, these skill gaps emerge very early in the life-cycle, persist, and
if anything, widen for some groups. Initial conditions (early test scores) are very important since
skill begets skill.36
The research surveyed in Pedro Carneiro and James J. Heckman37 suggests that enhanced cogni-
tive stimulation at early ages is likely to produce lasting gains in achievement test scores in children
from disadvantaged environments. If the interventions are early enough, they also appear to raise
IQ scores, at least for girls.38 Home and family environments at early ages, and even the mother￿s
behavior during pregnancy, play crucial roles in the child￿s development, and black children grow
up in signi￿cantly more disadvantaged environments than white children. Figure 5 shows the dis-
tributions of long-term or ￿permanent￿ family income for blacks, whites and Hispanics. Minority
children are much more likely to grow up in low income families than are white children. In our
web appendix,39 we show that there are also large diﬀerences in the level of education and cognitive
ability (as measured by the AFQT) of mothers in diﬀerent ethnic and racial groups (see also Figure
1). Maternal AFQT is a major predictor of children￿s test scores.40 Figure 6 documents that white
estimating intellectual development. The interviewer names each of ten body parts and asks the child to point to
that part of the body.
36See James J. Heckman, Policies to Foster Human Capital, 54 Res. in Econ. 3 (2000).
37S e en o t e2 1supra.
38See Frances Campbell, Craig Ramey, Elizabeth Pungello, Joseph Sparling and Shari Miller-Johnson, Early
Childhood Education: Young Adult Outcomes From the Abecedarian Project, 6 Applied Developmental Science 42
(2002).
39S e en o t e9supra.
40For example, the correlation between percentile PIAT math score and age-corrected maternal AFQT is 0.4.
10mothers are much more likely to read to their children at young ages than are minority mothers,
and we obtain similar results at other ages.41 Using this reading variable and other variables in
CNLSY such as the number of books, magazines, toys and musical recordings, family activities (eat-
ing, outings), methods of discipline and parenting, learning at home, TV watching habits, parental
expectations for the child (chores, time use), and home cleanliness and safety, we can construct
an index of cognitive and emotional stimulation￿the home score. This index is always higher for
whites than for minorities.42 There we also show that blacks are more likely than whites to grow
up in broken homes. Hispanics are less likely than blacks to grow up in a broken home, although
they are much more likely to do so than are whites.
Even after controlling for numerous environmental and family background factors, racial and
ethnic test score gaps remain at ages 3 and 4 for most tests and for virtually all the tests at
later ages. Figure 7 shows that, even after adjusting for measures of family background, such as
family long-term or ￿permanent￿ income and mother￿s education, the mother￿s cognitive ability (as
measured by age-corrected AFQT), and a measure of home environment called the home score, the
black-white gap in percentile PIAT Math scores at ages 5-6 is almost eight percentile points, and
at ages 13-14 is close to eleven percentile points. Hispanic-white diﬀerentials are reduced more by
such adjustments, falling to seven points at ages 5-6 and to four points at ages 13-14. For some
tests, diﬀerentials frequently are positive or statistically insigni￿cant.43 Measured home and family
environments play an important role in the formation of these skills, although they are not the
whole story.44
Early test scores for blacks and Hispanics are similar, although Hispanics often perform slightly
better. Figure 2 shows that for the PIAT Math score, the Hispanic-black gap is about two percentile
points.45 This is much smaller than either the black-white or the Hispanic-white gap. For the PIAT
41See the results for all ages in the web appendix, note 9 supra.
42A ss h o w ni nt h ew e ba p p e n d i x( s e en o t e9supra). In the web appendix, we document that both cognitive and
emotional stimulation indexes are always higher for whites than for blacks at all ages.
43In the web appendix, (see note 9 supra) Tables 1A-B report that even after controlling for diﬀerent measures of
home environments and child stimulation, the black-white test score gap persists even though it drops considerably.
Results for other tests and other samples can be found in the web appendix. Even though for some test scores early
black-white test score gaps can be eliminated once we control for a large number of characteristics, it is harder to
eliminate them at later ages. In the analysis presented here the most important variable in reducing the test score
gap is mother￿s cognitive ability, as measured by the AFQT.
44However, the home score includes variables such as the number of books, which are clearly choice variables and
likely to cause problems in this regression. The variables with the largest eﬀect on the minority-white test score gap
are maternal AFQT and raw home score.
45The test score is measured in percentile rank The black-white gap is slightly below 18 while the Hispanic-white
gap is slightly below 16. This means that the black-Hispanic gap should be around 2.
11Math test, the black-white gap widens dramatically, especially at later ages, but the Hispanic-white
gap does not change substantially with age. For other tests, even when there is some widening of
the Hispanic-white gap with age, it tends to be smaller than the widening in the black-white gap
in test scores. In particular, when we look at the AFQT scores displayed in Figure 1, and which
are measured using individuals at ages 16-23, Hispanics clearly have higher scores than blacks. In
contrast, Figure 4 shows a strong similarity between the math scores of blacks and Hispanics at
ages 5 and 6, although there are other tests where, even at these early ages, Hispanics perform
substantially better than blacks. When we control for the eﬀects of home and family environments
on test scores, the Hispanic-white test score gap either decreases or is constant over time while the
black-white test score tends to widen with age.
I I I T h eS t e r e o t y p eT h r e a t
The fact that substantial racial and ethnic test score gaps open up early in the life cycle of children
casts doubt on the empirical importance of the so-called ￿stereotype threat￿. It is now fashionable
in some circles to attribute gaps in black test scores to racial consciousness on the part of black
test takers stemming from the way test scores are used in public discourse to describe minorities.46
The claim is that blacks perform below their true abilities on standardized tests when a stereotype
threat is present. The empirical importance of the stereotype threat in accounting for test score
diﬀerentials has been greatly overstated in the popular literature.47 No serious empirical scholar
assigns any quantitative importance to stereotype threat eﬀects as a major determinant of test score
gaps.
Stereotype threats could not have been important when blacks took the ￿r s tI Qt e s t sa tt h e
beginning of the twentieth century which documented the racial diﬀe r e n t i a l st h a tg a v er i s et ot h e
stereotype. Yet racial IQ gaps are comparable across time.48 Young children, like the ones studied
in this paper, are unlikely to have the heightened racial consciousness about tests and their social
46S e en o t e1 7supra.
47See the analysis in Paul Sackett, Chaitra Hardison and Michael Cullen, note 18 supra.
48Charles Murray, in The Secular Increase in IQ and Longitudinal Changes in the Magnitude of the Black-White
Diﬀerence: Evidence from the NLSY, (paper presented at the Behavior Genetics Association Meeting, 1999), reviews
the evidence on the evolution of the black-white IQ gap. In the 1920s￿a time when such tests were much more
unreliable and black educational attainment much lower￿the mean black-white diﬀerence was 0.86 standard devia-
tions. The largest black-white diﬀerence appears in the 1960s, with a mean black-white diﬀerence of 1.28 standard
deviations. The diﬀerence ranges from a low of 0.82 standard deviations in the 1930s to 1.12 standard deviations
in the 1970s. However, none of the samples prior to 1960 are nationally representative, and the samples were often
chosen so as to eﬀectively bias the black mean upward.
12signi￿cance of the sort claimed to be found by Claude Steele and Joshua Aronson49 in college
students at a few elite universities. Moreover, sizable gaps are found for young Hispanic males￿a
group for which the ￿stereotype￿ threat remains to be investigated.
Additional evidence on the unimportance of stereotype threat is presented in Table 2.50 Accord-
ing to the stereotype threat literature, minority test scores understate true ability. If stereotyping
aﬀects the test score gap diﬀerently across ability levels, the eﬀect of a unit of ability for a black
should be diﬀerent that it is for a white. If the understatement is uniform across all ability levels,
the coeﬃcient on a dummy variable for race is overstated in a log wage regression (i.e.,m e a s u r e d
discrimination is understated). If the stereotype threat operates when minorities take the AFQT,
their scores should have a diﬀerent incremental eﬀect on wages than majority AFQT scores.51 We
test this hypothesis using the empirical model in Table 2. We estimate the eﬀect of black and
Hispanic AFQT relative to the eﬀect of white AFQT on log wages as extracted from the NLSY79.
This amounts to testing for racial AFQT interactions in a log-wage equation. While there is some
(weak) evidence that black scores have a larger eﬀect on log wages than white scores, the black-
AFQT interaction coeﬃcients are small in magnitude and imprecisely determined. For Hispanics,
the estimated AFQT interaction coeﬃcients are negative and, again, not precisely determined. In
our web appendix, we also graph the mean log wage by AFQT decile by race. There is no particular
pattern of convergence or divergence across ability levels when evaluated over common supports.
The stereotype literature substitutes wishful thinking for substantial evidence. There is no
evidence that it accounts for an important fraction of minority-white test score gaps, or that test
49S e en o t e1 7supra.
50See our web appendix (note 9 supra) for evidence on females.
51Let Y = α0 + α1T + ε,w h e r eE(ε | T)=0 . The same equation governs blacks and white outcomes. T is the
true test score. T∗ is the test score under stereotype threat:
T∗ = γ0 + γ1T + U, E(U | T)=0
Suppose Cov(ε,U)=0 . The web appendix shows that under random sampling the coeﬃcient on the test score for



































where E(T) is the mean of T, σ2
T is the variance of T,a n dσ2
U is the variance of U. Thus, the intercepts for blacks
are upward biased. The slope for blacks in general may be greater than or less than α1, depending on whether the
gap widens with T (γ1 < 1) or shrinks (γ1 > 1).W h e nσ2
U =0( U =0 ) , γ1 =1 , the slopes are the same for blacks
and whites but the intercepts are upward biased.
13scores are not good measures of productivity.52
IV The Diﬀerential Eﬀect of Schooling on Test Scores
We have established that cognitive test scores are correlated with home and family environments,
and that test score gaps increase with age and schooling. The research of Karsten Hansen, James
Heckman and Kathleen Mullen53 and De los Santos, Heckman and Larenas54 shows that the AFQT
test scores used by Neal and Johnson55 are aﬀected by schooling attainment of individuals at the
time they take the test. Therefore, one reason for the divergence of black and white test scores
over time may be diﬀerential schooling attainments. Figure 8 shows the schooling completed at the
test date for the six demographic groups in the age ranges of the NLSY used by Neal and Johnson.
Blacks have (slightly) less completed schooling at test date than whites, but substantially more
than Hispanics.
Table 3 presents estimates of the eﬀect of schooling at test date on AFQT scores for individuals in
diﬀerent demographic groups in the NLSY, using a version of the nonparametric method developed
in Hansen, Heckman and Mullen.56 Their method isolates the causal eﬀect of schooling attained at
the test date on test scores controlling for unobserved factors that lead to selective diﬀerences in
schooling attainment. This table shows that the eﬀect of schooling on test scores is much larger for
whites and Hispanics than it is for blacks over most ranges of schooling. As a result, even though
Hispanics have fewer years of completed schooling at the time they take the AFQT test than blacks,
on average Hispanics score better on the AFQT than do blacks.
There are diﬀerent explanations for these ￿ndings. Carneiro and Heckman57 and Cunha and
Heckman58 suggest that one important feature of the learning process is complementarity and self
productivity between initial endowments of human capital and subsequent learning.59 Higher levels
52A circular version of the stereotype threat argument would claim that minorities also underperform at the
workplace because of stereotype threat there, so that using measured wages to capture productivity understates true
black productivity. This form of the stereotype threat argument is irrefutable. All measures are contaminated.
53S e en o t e1 4supra.
54S e en o t e1 6supra.
55S e en o t e6supra.
56See note 14 supra. De los Santos, Heckman and Larenas (see note 16, supra)p r e s e n tam o r er e ￿ned analysis of
the racial/ethnic wage gap using the Hansen, Heckman, Mullen analysis that supports all of our main conclusions.
See also the note at the base of Table 3.
57S e en o t e2 1supra.
58Flavio Cunha and James Heckman, The Technology of Skill Formation, (Unpublished manuscript, Univ. Chicago,
2004).
59For example, see the model in Yoram Ben-Porath, The Production of Human Capital and the Life Cycle of
14of human capital raise the productivity of learning.60 Since minorities and whites start school with
very diﬀerent initial conditions, their learning paths can diverge dramatically over time. A related
explanation may be that blacks and non-blacks learn at diﬀerent rates because blacks attend lower
quality schools than whites.61
Janet Currie and Duncan Thomas62 show that test score gains of participants in the Head Start
program tend to fade completely for blacks but not for whites. They suggest that one reason may be
that blacks attend worse schools than whites, and therefore blacks are not able to maintain initial
test score gains. Both early advantages and disadvantages as well as school quality are likely to be
important factors in the human capital accumulation process.
In light of the greater growth in test scores of Hispanics that is parallel to that of whites,
explanations based on schooling quality are not entirely compelling. Hispanics start from similar
initial disadvantages in family environments and face school and neighborhood environments similar
to those faced by blacks.63 They also have early levels of test scores similar to those found in the
black population.64
To analyze the consequences of correcting for diﬀerent levels of schooling at the test date, we
reanalyze Neal and Johnson￿s65 data using AFQT scores corrected for the race- or ethnicity-speci￿c
eﬀect of schooling while equalizing the years of schooling attained at the date of the test across all
racial/ethnic groups. The results of this adjustment are presented in Table 4. This adjustment is
equivalent to replacing each individual￿s AFQT score by the score we would measure if he or she
would have stopped his or her formal education after eighth grade.66 In other words, we use ￿eighth
grade￿ adjusted AFQT scores for everyone. Since the eﬀect of schooling on test scores is higher
for whites than for blacks, and whites have more schooling than blacks at the date of the test, this
Earnings, 75 J. Pol. Econ. 352 (1967). See also note 58 supra.
60See the evidence in the paper by James Heckman, Lance Lochner and Christopher Taber, Explaining Rising
Wage Inequality: Explorations with a Dynamic General Equilibrium Model of Labor Earnings with Heterogeneous
Agents, 1 Rev. Econ. Dynamics 1 (1998).
61Cunha and Heckman (see note 58 supra) show that complementarity implies that early human capital increase
the productivity of later investments in human capital, and also that early investments that are not followed up by
later investments in human capital are not productive.
62Janet Currie and Duncan Thomas, School Quality and the Longer-Term Eﬀects of Head Start, 35 J. Human
Resources 755 (2000).
63T h ee v i d e n c ef o rC N L S Yi sp r e s e n t e di nt h ew e ba p p e n d i x( s e en o t e9supra).
64De los Santos, Heckman and Larenas (see note 16 supra) present a more formal analysis of the eﬀect of schooling
quality on test scores, showing that schooling inputs explain little of the diﬀerential growth in test scores among
blacks, whites and Hispanics.
65S e en o t e6supra.
66However, the score is aﬀected by attendance in kindergarten, eight further years of schooling, and any school
quality diﬀerentials in those years.
15adjustment reduces the test scores of whites much more than those for blacks. The black-white
male wage gap is only cut in half (as opposed to 76%) when we use this new measure of skill, and
a substantial unexplained residual remains. The adjustment has little eﬀect on the Hispanic-white
wage gap but a wage gap for black women emerges when using the schooling-adjusted measure that
did not appear in the original Neal-Johnson study.
Adjusting for schooling at the date of the test reduces the test score gap. This evidence raises the
larger question of what a ￿pre-market￿ factor is. Neal and Johnson do not condition on schooling
in explaining black-white wage gaps, arguing that schooling is aﬀected by expectations of adverse
market opportunities facing minorities and conditioning on such a contaminated variable would
spuriously reduce the estimated wage gap. We present direct evidence on this claim below.
Their reasoning is not coherent. If expectations of discrimination aﬀect schooling, the very logic
of their ￿pre-market￿ argument suggests that they should control for the impact of schooling on
test scores before using test scores to measure premarket factors. Neal and Johnson67 assume that
s c h o o l i n ga tt h et i m eo ft h et e s ti st a k e ni sn o ta ﬀected by expectations of discrimination in the
market, while later schooling is.
This distinction is arbitrary. A deeper investigation of the expectation formation process and
feedback is required. One practical conclusion with important implications for the interpretation of
t h ee v i d e n c ei st h a tt h em a g n i t u d eo ft h ew a g eg a po n ec a ne l i m i n a t eb yp e r f o r m i n gaN e a l - J o h n s o n
a n a l y s i sd e p e n d so nt h ea g ea tw h i c ht h et e s ti sm e a s u r e d .T h ee a r l i e rt h et e s ti st a k e n ,t h es m a l l e r
the unadjusted test score gap, and the larger the fraction of the wage gap that is unexplained by the
residual. Figure 9 shows how adjusting measured ability for schooling attained at the time of the
t e s ta td i ﬀerent levels of attained schooling aﬀects the adjusted wage gap for black males. In this
￿gure, the log wage gap corresponding to grade of AFQT correction equal to 11 is the log wage gap
we obtain when using ￿eleventh grade￿ test scores (that is, scores adjusted to the eleventh grade
level). The later the grade at which we adjust the test score, the lower the estimated gap. This
is so because an ability gap opens up at later schooling levels, and hence adjustment reduces the
gap.68
Finally we show that adjusting for ￿expectations-contaminated￿ completed schooling by enter-
ing it as a direct regression in a log wage equation does not operate in the fashion conjectured by
Neal and Johnson. Table 5 shows that when we adjust wage diﬀerences for completed schooling as
67S e en o t e6supra.
68I nt h ew e ba p p e n d i x( s e en o t e9supra) we present the same analysis for females and Hispanics.
16well as schooling-adjusted AFQT, wage gaps widen relative to the simple adjustment. This runs
contrary to the simple intuition that schooling embodies expectations of market discrimination, so
that conditioning on it will eliminate wage gaps.69 The deeper issue, not resolved in this paper or
the literature, is what productivity factors to condition on in measuring discrimination. Schooling
and measured ability are both valid candidate productivity variables. Conditioning on them singly
or jointly and eliminating spurious endogeneity eﬀects produces conceptually diﬀerent measures of
the wage gap, all of which answer distinct but economically interesting questions. Both variables
may be aﬀected by discrimination. Looking only at outcome equations, one cannot settle what is a
productivity characteristic and what is contaminated and what is not.70,71 Deleting potential conta-
minated variables does not, in general, produce the conceptually desired measure of discrimination.
Ours is a worst-case analysis for the Neal-Johnson study.72 If we assign all racial and ethnic
schooling diﬀerences to expectations of discrimination in the labor market, their results for blacks
are less sharp than they claim. Yet even in the worst case scenario, adjusting for ability corrected for
schooling and schooling as a direct eﬀect on wages substantially reduces minority-majority wage
gaps over the unadjusted case. The evidence presented in Section II about the early emergence
of ability diﬀerentials is reinforced by the early emergence of diﬀerential grade repetition gaps for
minorities documented by Cameron and Heckman.73 Most of the schooling gap at the date of the
test emerges in the early years at ages when child expectations about future discrimination are
unlikely to be operative. One might argue that these early schooling and ability gaps are due to
parental expectations of poor labor markets for minority children. We next examine data on child
and parental expectations.
69The simple intuition, however, can easily be shown to be wrong so the evidence in these tables is not decisive
on the presence of discrimination in the labor market. The basic idea is that if both schooling and the test score
a r ec o r r e l a t e dw i t ha nu n m e a s u r e dd i s crimination component in the error term, the bias for the race dummy may
be either positive or negative depending on the strength of the correlation among the contaminated variables and
their correlation with the error term. See the discussion in the web appendix, (note 9 supra). There we show that
if both schooling and the test score are correlated with factors leading to discrimination in earnings, the estimated
discrimination eﬀect may be upward or downward biased by adding schooling as a regressor.
70See Robert Bornholz and James J. Heckman, Measuring Disparate Impacts and Extending Disparate Impact
Doctrine to Organ Transplantation, 48 Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, forthcoming (2005).
71As pointed out to us by an anonymous referee, another reason for excluding years of schooling from the log wage
equation is that schooling overstates the amount of human capital black children receive relative to white children,
say due to diﬀerential schooling quality. If this eﬀect is strong enough, including years of schooling will overstate the
racial wage diﬀerential. Table 3 shows that years of schooling for black children have less eﬀect on human capital
(the test score) than years of white schooling. However, De los Santos, Heckman and Larenas (see note 16 supra),
show that measured schooling quality accounts for little of the gap or the growth in the gap between blacks and
whites.
72S e en o t e6supra.
73S e en o t e1 1supra.
17V The Role of Expectations
The argument that minority children perform worse on tests because they expect to be less well
rewarded in the labor market than whites for the same test score or schooling level is implausible
because expectations of labor market rewards are unlikely to aﬀect the behavior of children as
early as ages 3 or 4 when test score gaps are substantial across diﬀerent ethnic and racial groups.
The argument that minorities invest less in skills because both minority children and minority
p a r e n t sh a v el o we x p e c t a t i o n sa b o u tt h e i rp e r f o r m a n c ei ns c h o o la n di nt h el a b o rm a r k e th a sm i x e d
empirical backing.
Data on expectations are hard to ￿nd, and when they are available they are often diﬃcult to
interpret. For example, in the NLSY97, black 17- and 18-year-olds report that the probability of
dying next year is 22% while for whites it is 16%.74 Both numbers are absurdly high. Minorities
usually report higher expectations than whites of committing a crime, being incarcerated and being
dead next year, and these adverse expectations may reduce their investment in human capital.
Expectations reported by parents and children for the child adolescent years for a variety of outcomes
a r eg i v e ni nt h ew e ba p p e n d i x . 75
Schooling expectations measured in the late teenage years are very similar for minorities and
whites. They are slightly lower for Hispanics. Table 6a reports the mean expected probability
of being enrolled in school next year, for black, white and Hispanic 17- to 18-year old males.
Among those individuals enrolled in 1997, on average whites expect to be enrolled next year with
95.7% probability. Blacks expect that they will be enrolled next year with a 93.6% probability.
Hispanics expect to be enrolled with a 91.5% probability. If expectations about the labor market
are adverse for minorities, they should translate into adverse expectations for the child￿s education.
Yet these data do not reveal this. Moreover, all groups substantially overestimate actual enrollment
probabilities. The diﬀerence in expectations between blacks and whites is very small, and is less
than half the diﬀerence in actual (realized) enrollment probabilities (81.9% for whites versus 76.4%
for blacks). The gap is wider for Hispanics. Table 6b reports parental schooling expectations for
white, black and Hispanic males for the same individuals used to compute the numbers in Table 6a.
It shows that, conditional on being enrolled in 1997 (the year the expectation question is asked),
black parents expect their sons to be enrolled next year with a 90.9% probability, while for whites
74See the web appendix, Table 3 for evidence on expectations from NLSY97 (see note 9 supra).
75S e en o t e9supra.
18this expectation is 95.4%. For Hispanics this number is lower (88.5%) but still substantial. Parents
overestimate enrollment probabilities for their sons, but black parents have lower expectations than
white parents. For females the racial and ethnic diﬀerences in parental expectations are smaller
than those for males.76
For expectations measured at earlier ages the story is dramatically diﬀerent. Figures 10a-b show
that, for the CNLSY, both black and Hispanic children and their parents have more pessimistic
expectations about schooling than white children, and more pessimistic expectations may lead to
lower investments in skills, less eﬀort in schooling and lower ability. These patterns are also found
in the CPSID and ECLS.77
If the more pessimistic expectations of minorities are a result of perceived market discrimination,
then lower investments in children that translate into lower levels of ability and skill at later ages
are attributable to market discrimination. Ability would not be a premarket factor. However, lower
expectations for minorities may not be a result of discrimination but just a rational response to the
fact that minorities do not do as well in school as whites. This may be due to environmental factors
unrelated to expectations of discrimination in the labor market. Whether this phenomenon itself
is a result of discrimination is an open question. Expectation formation models are very complex
and often lead to multiple equilibria, and are, therefore, diﬃcult to test empirically. However, the
evidence reported here does not provide much support for the claim that the ability measure used
by Neal and Johnson78 is substantially contaminated by expectational eﬀects.
V I T h eE v i d e n c eo nN o n c o g n i t i v eS k i l l s
Controlling for scholastic ability in accounting for minority-majority wage gaps captures only part
of the endowment diﬀerences between groups but receives most of the emphasis in the literature
on black-white gaps in wages. An emerging body of evidence, summarized by Samuel Bowles, Her-
bert Gintis and Melissa Osborne,79 Carneiro and Heckman,80 and Heckman, Stixrud and Urzua,81
76See the web appendix, (see note 9 supra).
77For CNLSY teenagers, expectations across racial groups seem to converge at later ages. See the web appendix,
(see note 9 supra).
78S e en o t e6supra.
79Samuel Bowles, Herbert Gintis and Melissa Osborne, The Determinants of Earnings: A Behavioral Approach,
39 J. Econ. Lit. 1137 (2001).
80S e en o t e2 1supra.
81James Heckman, Jora Stixrud and Sergio Urzua, Evidence on the Importance of Cognitive and Noncognitive
Skills on Social and Economic Outcomes, (Unpublished manuscript, University of Chicago, 2004).
19documents that noncognitive skills￿motivation, self control, time preference and social skills￿are
important in explaining socioeconomic success.82
The CNLSY has life cycle measures of noncognitive skills. Mothers are asked age-speci￿c ques-
tions about the antisocial behavior of their children such as aggressiveness or violent behavior,
cheating or lying, disobedience, peer con￿icts and social withdrawal. The answers to these ques-
tions are grouped in diﬀerent indices.83 Figure 11 shows that there are important racial and ethnic
gaps in antisocial behavior index that emerge in early childhood. The higher the score, the worse
the behavior. By ages 5 and 6, the average black is roughly 10 percentile points above the average
white in the distribution of this score.84 The results shown in Figure 12, where we adjust the gaps
by permanent family income, mother￿s education and age-corrected AFQT and home score, also
show large reductions.85
SectionII documents that minority and white children face substantial diﬀerences in family and
home environments while growing up. The evidence presented in this section shows that these early
environmental diﬀerences account (in a correlational sense) for most of the minority-white gap in
noncognitive skills, as measured in the CNLSY.
Carneiro and Heckman86 document that noncognitive skills are more malleable than cognitive
skills and are more easily shaped by interventions. More motivated children achieve more and
have higher measured achievement test scores than less motivated children of the same ability. The
largest eﬀects of interventions in childhood and adolescence are on noncognitive skills which promote
learning and integration into the larger society. Improvements in these skills produce better labor
82Some of the best evidence for the importance of noncognitive skills in the labor market is from the GED (General
Education Development) program. This program examines high school dropouts to certify that they are equivalent
to high school graduates. In its own terms, the GED program is successful. James J. Heckman and Yona Rubinstein,
The Importance of Noncognitive Skills: Lessons from the GED Testing Program, 91 Am. Econ. Rev. 145 (2001),
show that GED recipients and ordinary high school graduates who do not go on to college have the same distribution
of AFQT scores (the same test that is graphed in Figure 1). Yet GED recipients earn the wages of high school
dropouts with the same number of years of completed schooling. They are more likely to quit their jobs, engage in
￿ghting or petty crime, or to be discharged from the military, than are high school graduates who do not go on to
college or other high school dropouts. Intelligence alone is not suﬃcient for socioeconomic success. Minority-white
gaps in noncognitive skills open up early and widen over the lifecycle.
83The children￿s mothers were asked 28 age-speci￿c questions about frequency, range and type of speci￿cb e h a v i o r
problems that children age four and over may have exhibited in the previous three months. Factor analysis was used
to determine six clusters of questions. The responses for each cluster were then dichotomized and summed. The
Antisocial Behavior index we use in this paper consists of measures of cheating and telling lies, bullying and cruelty
to others, not feeling sorry for misbehaving, breaking things deliberately (if age is less than 12), disobedience at
school (if age is greater than 5), and trouble getting along with teachers (if age is greater than 5).
84I nt h ew e ba p p e n d i x( s e e9supra), we show that these diﬀerences are statistically strong. Once we control for
family and home environments, gaps in most behavioral indices disappear.
85See the web appendix, Tables 2A-2B for the eﬀect of adjusting for other environmental characteristics on the
antisocial behavior score (see note 9 supra).
86S e en o t e2 1supra.
20market outcomes, less engagement in criminal activities and other risky behavior. Promotion of
noncognitive skill is an avenue for policy that warrants much greater attention.
VII Summary and Conclusion
This paper discusses the sources of wage gaps between minorities and whites. For all minorities but
black males, adjusting for the ability that minorities bring to the market eliminates wage gaps. The
major source of economic disparity by race and ethnicity in U.S. labor markets is in endowments,
not in payments to endowments.
This evidence suggests that strengthened civil rights and aﬃrmative action policies targeted at
the labor market are unlikely to have much eﬀect on racial and ethnic wage gaps, except possibly
for those speci￿cally targeted toward black males.87 Policies that foster endowments have much
greater promise. On the other hand, this paper does not provide any empirical evidence on whether
or not the existing edi￿ce of civil rights and aﬃrmative action legislation should be abolished. All
of our evidence on wages is for an environment where aﬃrmative action laws and regulations are in
place.
Minority de￿cits in cognitive and noncognitive skills emerge early and widen. Unequal school-
ing, neighborhoods and peers may account for this diﬀerential growth in skills, but the main story
in the data is not about growth rates but rather about the size of early de￿cits. Hispanic children
start with cognitive and noncognitive de￿cits similar to those of black children. They also grow up
in similar disadvantaged environments, and are likely to attend schools of similar quality. Hispanics
have substantially less schooling than blacks. Nevertheless, the ability growth by years of school-
ing is much higher for Hispanics than blacks. By the time they reach adulthood, Hispanics have
signi￿cantly higher test scores than blacks. Conditional on test scores, there is no evidence of an
important Hispanic-white wage gap. Our analysis of the Hispanic data illuminates the traditional
study of black-white diﬀerences and casts doubt on many conventional explanations of these diﬀer-
ences since they do not apply to Hispanics who also suﬀer from many of the same disadvantages.
The failure of the Hispanic-white gap to widen with schooling or age casts doubt on the claim that
poor schools and bad neighborhoods are the reasons for the slow growth rate in black test scores.
De￿cits in noncognitive skills can be explained (in a statistical sense) by adverse early environments;
87However, even for black males, a substantial fraction of the racial wage gap can be attributed to diﬀerences in
skill.
21de￿cits in cognitive skills are less easily eliminated by the same factors.
We have reexamined the Neal-Johnson88 analysis that endowments acquired before people enter
the market explain most of the minority-majority wage gap. They use an ability test taken in the
teenage years as a measure of endowment unaﬀected by discrimination. They omit schooling in ad-
justing for racial and ethnic wage gaps, arguing that schooling choices are potentially contaminated
by expectations of labor market discrimination. Yet they do not adjust their measure of ability by
the schooling attained at the date of the test, which would be the appropriate correction if their
argument were correct.
Adjusting wage gaps by both completed schooling and the schooling-adjusted test widens wage
gaps for all groups. This adjustment eﬀect is especially strong for blacks. Nonetheless, half of the
black-white male wage gap is still explained by the adjusted score. At issue is how much of the
majority-minority diﬀerence in schooling at the date of the test is due to expectations of labor
market discrimination and how much is due to adverse early environments. While this paper does
n o ts e t t l et h i sq u e s t i o nd e ￿nitively, test score gaps emerge early and are more plausibly linked to
adverse early environments. The lion￿s share of the ability gaps at the date of the test emerge very
early, before children can have clear expectations about their labor market prospects.
The analysis of Sackett, Hardison and Cullen89 and the emergence of test score gaps in young
children casts serious doubt on the importance of ￿stereotype threats￿ in accounting for poorer
black test scores. It is implausible that young minority test takers have the social consciousness
assumed in the stereotype literature. If true, black skills are understated by the tests, and the
market return to ability should be diﬀerent for blacks than for whites. We ￿nd no evidence of such
an eﬀect.
Gaps in test scores of the magnitude found in recent studies were found in the earliest tests
developed at the beginning of the twentieth century, before the results of testing were disseminated
and a stereotype threat could have been ￿in the air.￿ The recent emphasis on the stereotype threat
as a basis for black white test scores ignores the evidence that tests are predictive of schooling
attainment and market wages. It diverts attention away from the emergence of important skill gaps
at early ages, which should be a target of public policy.
Eﬀective social policy designed to eliminate racial and ethnic inequality for most minorities
should focus on eliminating skill gaps, not on discrimination in the workplace of the early Twenty-
88S e en o t e6supra.
89S e en o t e1 8supra.
22First Century. Interventions targeted at adults are much less eﬀective and do not compensate
for early de￿cits. Early interventions aimed at young children hold much greater promise than
strengthened legal activism in the workplace.
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26Year
II III III III III III III III I
Black -0.250 -0.060 -0.251 -0.082 -0.302 -0.113 -0.282 -0.104 -0.286 -0.093 -0.373 -0.149 -0.333 -0.069 -0.325 -0.089
(0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.029) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030) (0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035)
Hispanic -0.174 -0.035 -0.113 0.020 -0.146 -0.014 -0.159 -0.027 -0.143 0.005 -0.186 -0.031 -0.195 -0.006 -0.215 -0.053
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038)
Age - 0.050 - 0.030 - 0.038 - 0.030 - 0.023 - 0.020 - 0.014 - 0.008
- (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.016) - (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.017)
AFQT - 0.183 - 0.161 - 0.179 - 0.172 - 0.188 - 0.216 - 0.254 - 0.241
- (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.014) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015)
AFQT
2 - -0.022 - -0.007 - -0.001 - 0.002 - 0.014 - 0.021 - 0.032 - 0.023
- (0.011) - (0.011) - (0.011) - (0.011) - (0.012) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013)
Intercept 2.375 0.957 2.372 1.463 2.404 1.202 2.423 1.431 2.458 1.652 2.533 1.756 2.589 1.960 2.629 2.224
(0.017) (0.385) (0.017) (0.406) (0.017) (0.422) (0.017) (0.432) (0.018) (0.488) (0.019) (0.540) (0.020) (0.594) (0.020) (0.621)
N 1538 1505 1553 1514 1536 1503 1542 1504 1522 1485 1554 1519 1494 1462 1438 1404
Year:
II III III III III III III III I
Black -0.172 0.041 -0.200 0.030 -0.201 0.010 -0.167 0.093 -0.148 0.099 -0.147 0.132 -0.201 0.071 -0.200 0.069
(0.031) (0.033) (0.032) (0.035) (0.031) (0.033) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.036) (0.034) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038)
Hispanic -0.003 0.154 -0.017 0.153 -0.059 0.114 0.009 0.198 -0.018 0.170 -0.006 0.193 -0.069 0.151 -0.064 0.149
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.038) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039) (0.041) (0.041)
Age - 0.010 - 0.038 - 0.016 - 0.016 - 0.008 - -0.009 - 0.013 - -0.018
- (0.015) - (0.017) - (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.017) - (0.018)
AFQT - 0.217 - 0.234 - 0.229 - 0.271 - 0.267 - 0.283 - 0.274 - 0.273
- (0.016) - (0.018) - (0.017) - (0.018) - (0.019) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.018)
AFQT
2 - 0.005 - 0.000 - -0.001 - -0.012 - -0.024 - 0.005 - 0.000 - -0.008
- (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.015) - (0.016) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015)
Intercept 2.141 1.750 2.175 0.982 2.193 1.615 2.174 1.558 2.218 1.858 2.246 2.412 2.311 1.724 2.339 2.867
(0.019) (0.420) (0.020) (0.467) (0.019) (0.458) (0.021) (0.520) (0.022) (0.555) (0.022) (0.582) (0.021) (0.603) (0.022) (0.663)
N 1356 1325 1335 1299 1317 1278 1319 1281 1318 1288 1381 1344 1370 1329 1316 1276
Table 1.   Change in the Black-White log wage gap induced by controlling for age-corrected AFQT in 1990-2000
1990 1991 1992 1993
A. NLSY men born after 1961
1993 1994 1998
B. NLSY women born after 1961
2000
1994
Age-corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables. AFQT is a subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by the military for 
enlistment screening and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning ASVAB tests. All wages are in 1993 
dollars. The coefficients on the AFQT variables represent the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the score on the log hourly wage. Since the wage is measured in log points, the gaps for blacks and 
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Standardized Score
White Black Hispanic
Age−corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the
time of the test dummy variables. AFQT is a subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by the military
for enlistment screening and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge, paragraph
comprehension, mathematics knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning ASVAB tests.
NLSY79 Males Born After 1961
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5−6 7−8 9−10 11−12 13−14
Child’s Age
White Black Hispanic
This test measures the child’s attainment in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. It consists of 84
multiple−choice questions of increasing difficulty, beginning with recognizing numerals and progressing to
geometry and trigonometry. The percentile score was calculated separately for each sex at each age.
CNLSY79 Males
Figure 2
































This test attempts to measure the young child’s receptive vocabulary knowledge of orally presented words as a means
of estimating intellectual development. The interviewer names each of ten body parts and asks the child to point to that
part of the body. The score is computed by summing the number of correct responses. The percentile score was calculated
separately for each sex at each age.
CNLSY79 Males 
Figure 3
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White Black Hispanic
This test measures the child’s attainment in mathematics as taught in mainstream education. It consists of 84
multiple−choice questions of increasing difficulty, beginning with recognizing numerals and progressing to
geometry and trigonometry. The percentile score was calculated separately for each sex at each age.
CNLSY 79 Males
Figure 4
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Log of Permanent Income
White Black Hispanic
Permanent income is constructed by taking the average of all nonmissing values of annual family income at ages 0−18 and
discounted to child’s age 0 using a 10% discount rate.
CNLSY 79 Males and Females
Figure 5










































































Never  Several Times a Year  Several Times a Month  Once A Week  About 3 Times a Week   Every Day 
 Fraction 
The height of the bar is produced by dividing the number of people who report falling in a particular reading frequency cell
by the total number of people in their race−sex group
CNLSY79
Figure 6




























5−6 7−8 9−10 11−12 13−14
Child’s Age
White Black Hispanic
Adjusted by permanent family income, mother’s education and age−corrected AFQT, and home score.
Adjusted indicates that we equalized the family background characteristics across all race groups by setting them at
the mean to purge the effect of family environment disparities. Permanent income is constructed by taking the average
of annual family income discounted to child’s age 0 using a 10% discount rate. Age−corrected AFQT is the standardized
residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables. Home score is an
index of quality of the child’s home environment.
CNLSY79 Males
Figure 7












































Less Than or Equal To 9 Years  10 Years  11 Years  12 Years  13−14 Years 
Fraction
The height of the bar is produced by dividing the number of people who report falling in a particular education cell
by the total number of people in their race−sex group
NLSY79 Men and Women Born After 1961
Figure 8
Highest Category of Schooling Completed at Test Date
by Race, Sex and Age 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1998 2000
Age-Adjusted AFQT 0.1791** 0.1714** 0.1821** 0.1814** 0.1966** 0.2283** 0.2808** 0.2462**
(0.0161) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0163) (0.0179) (0.0184) (0.0191) (0.0186)
Black -0.045 -0.0702* -0.0892** -0.0900** -0.0753* -0.1453** -0.0696 -0.0714
(0.0314) (0.0318) (0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0344) (0.0356) (0.0368) (0.0368)
Interaction of Black and AFQT 0.0307 0.0014 0.0361 0.0093 0.0228 -0.0072 -0.0384 0.0292
(0.0302) (0.0306) (0.0308) (0.0303) (0.0334) (0.0349) (0.0362) (0.0362)
Hispanic -0.0451 0.0116 -0.0258 -0.0357 -0.0073 -0.0367 -0.0103 -0.0645
(0.0326) (0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0327) (0.0364) (0.0381) (0.0389) (0.0386)
Interaction of Hispanic and AFQT -0.037 -0.0629 -0.0564 -0.0566 -0.0529 -0.0239 -0.0524 -0.0345
(0.0329) (0.0336) (0.0336) (0.0339) (0.0375) (0.0398) (0.0401) (0.0398)
Constant 2.2897** 2.2902** 2.3159** 2.3371** 2.3681** 2.4289** 2.4591** 2.5293**
(0.0175) (0.0177) (0.0178) (0.0178) (0.0194) (0.0200) (0.0208) (0.0203)
Observations 1505 1514 1503 1504 1485 1519 1462 1404
R-squared 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.17 0.21 0.23 0.23
F statistic 1.556 1.897 2.787 1.682 1.578 0.182 1.139 0.927
Significance Level 0.211 0.150 0.062 0.186 0.207 0.834 0.320 0.396
Table 2. Pooled Log Wage Regressions for 1990-2000, NLSY Males
Age-corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables. AFQT is a subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by 
the military for enlistment screening and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning 
ASVAB tests. All wages are in 1993 dollars. The coefficients on the AFQT variables represent the effect of a one standard deviation increase in the score on the log hourly wage. Since the wage 
is measured in log points, the gaps for blacks and hispanics correspond approximately to percentage point differences relative to the white mean; that is, the black-white gap of -.25 in 1990 
corresponds to 25% lower wages for blacks in that year. The joint null hypothesis for the Wald F test was that all of the race-AFQT interaction coefficients are zero.
Year
Standard errors in parentheses: * indicates significant at 5%; ** indicates significant at 1%.Schooling At Test Date Males Females Males Females Males Females
9 years 12.68 14.66 5.21 5.95 9.80 11.22
 Std. Err. (1.51) (1.70) (1.58) (1.74) (1.90) (1.79)
 N 378 343 234 234 167 179
10 years 16.94 16.12 9.22 5.65 16.33 14.99
 Std. Err. (1.52) (1.68) (1.53) (1.73) (1.94) (1.85)
 N 377 368 282 237 161 169
11 years 22.02 18.55 8.87 10.62 18.67 16.83
 Std. Err. (1.54) (1.72) (1.58) (1.75) (2.11) (2.01)
 N 366 327 247 243 120 122
12 years 23.12 21.05 11.96 11.12 21.29 16.46
 Std. Err. (1.49) (1.64) (1.58) (1.70) (2.08) (1.95)
 N 630 758 322 393 171 198
13-15 years 26.60 24.37 15.37 14.23 23.96 18.92
 Std. Err. (1.73) (1.83) (2.23) (2.00) (2.82) (2.55)
 N 266 326 98 180 72 81
16 or more years 29.02 25.71 28.43 22.66 33.11 31.18
 Std. Err. (2.13) (2.24) (3.56) (2.99) (4.70) (4.03)
 N 108 103 27 34 17 22
Mean 52.50 51.95 36.79 37.44 38.45 36.87
 Std. Dev. (19.11) (17.81) (17.76) (16.15) (19.17) (17.80)
 N 165 110 172 98 154 137
a This table reports coefficients of a regression of AFQT scores on schooling at test date and completed
schooling. Completed schooling is included to control for unobserved ability that may be correlated with
schooling at test date (control function). Schooling at test date is measured by the set of dummy variables
reported in panel A of the table. The omitted category is 8 years of schooling or less. Completed schooling
(not reported in the table) is measured with dummy variables for four categories: less than high school, high
school, some college and college. We run a different regression for each race-gender group. The numbers
reported in panel B are the predicted value of these regressions when schooling at test date is equal to 8 or less
years of schooling. For example, white males with 12 years of schooling at test date would score 23.12 points
higher on the AFQT than they would if they only had 8 years of schooling at that time. N corresponds to the
number of observations in each race-gender-schooling at test date cell.
B. Mean schooling-corrected AFQT for those with 8 years of schooling
Table 3.  AFQT and schooling, NLSY79
White Black Hispanic
A. Effect of schooling on raw AFQT
aYear
II III III III III III III II I I
Black -0.250 -0.133 -0.251 -0.149 -0.302 -0.180 -0.282 -0.171 -0.286 -0.165 -0.373 -0.230 -0.333 -0.160 -0.325 -0.172
(0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.028) (0.029) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.034) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033)
Hispanic -0.174 -0.070 -0.113 -0.013 -0.146 -0.044 -0.159 -0.058 -0.143 -0.029 -0.186 -0.067 -0.195 -0.047 -0.215 -0.088
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038) (0.040) (0.038)
Age - 0.065 - 0.043 - 0.055 - 0.045 - 0.040 - 0.039 - 0.036 - 0.029
- (0.014) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.017) - (0.017)
AFQT - 0.153 - 0.131 - 0.155 - 0.144 - 0.159 - 0.184 - 0.221 - 0.211
- (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.013) - (0.014) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015)
AFQT
2 - 0.001 - 0.009 - 0.015 - 0.017 - 0.028 - 0.031 - 0.040 - 0.036
- (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.011) - (0.012) - (0.012) - (0.012)
Constant 2.375 0.540 2.372 1.085 2.404 0.732 2.423 0.982 2.458 1.119 2.533 1.140 2.589 1.172 2.629 1.425
(0.017) (0.392) (0.017) (0.412) (0.017) (0.426) (0.017) (0.437) (0.018) (0.493) (0.019) (0.547) (0.020) (0.603) (0.020) (0.628)
N 1538 1505 1553 1514 1536 1503 1542 1504 1522 1485 1554 1519 1494 1462 1438 1404
Year
II III III III III III III II I I
Black -0.172 -0.045 -0.200 -0.066 -0.201 -0.083 -0.167 -0.020 -0.148 -0.014 -0.147 0.025 -0.201 -0.043 -0.200 -0.041
(0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.035)
Hispanic -0.003 0.116 -0.017 0.107 -0.059 0.069 0.009 0.145 -0.018 0.119 -0.006 0.149 -0.069 0.098 -0.064 0.096
(0.035) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037) (0.036) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.041) (0.040)
Age - 0.015 - 0.042 - 0.021 - 0.024 - 0.015 - -0.003 - 0.019 - -0.010
- (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.016) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.017) - (0.018)
AFQT - 0.188 - 0.197 - 0.187 - 0.221 - 0.221 - 0.245 - 0.228 - 0.235
- (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.016) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.018) - (0.017) - (0.018)
AFQT
2 - 0.010 - 0.009 - 0.010 - 0.006 - -0.008 - 0.022 - 0.017 - 0.005
- (0.013) - (0.014) - (0.013) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015)
Constant 2.141 1.633 2.175 0.893 2.193 1.488 2.174 1.337 2.218 1.662 2.246 2.228 2.311 1.550 2.339 2.608
(0.019) (0.424) (0.020) (0.472) (0.019) (0.465) (0.021) (0.530) (0.022) (0.565) (0.022) (0.588) (0.021) (0.612) (0.022) (0.671)
N 1356 1325 1335 1299 1317 1278 1319 1281 1318 1287 1381 1343 1370 1328 1316 1276
Table 4. Change in the Black-White log wage gap induced by controlling for schooling-corrected AFQT for 1990-2000
1990 1991 1992 1993




B. NLSY women born after 1961
Schooling-corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables and final level of schooling completed
during lifetime. AFQT is a subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by the military for enlistment screening and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge,
paragraph comprehension, mathematics knowledge, and arithmetic reasoning ASVAB tests. All wages are in 1993 dollars.

















8 or Less Years 9 Years 10 Years 11 Years 12 Years 13−15 Years
Grade At Which We Evaluate the Schooling−Corrected AFQT
Adjusted Male Black−White Gap Unadjusted Male Black−White Gap
Note: We have omitted the results for the 16−or−More category because the low number of minorities in that cell
makes the correction of the test scores to that schooling level much less reliable than the correction to the other
schooling levels. The unadjusted line refers to the black−white log wage gap we observe if we do not control for AFQT
scores (column I in table 1). Therefore it is a horizontal line since it does not depend on the grade to which we are
correcting the test score. The adjusted line refers to the black−white log wage gap we observe after we adjust for the
AFQT scores corrected to different grades.
NLSY79 Males
Figure 9
Residual Black−White Log Wage Gap in 1991 by Grade At Which
We Evaluate The Schooling−Corrected AFQTYear:
I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II
Black -0.250 -0.144 -0.251 -0.158 -0.302 -0.189 -0.282 -0.182 -0.286 -0.175 -0.373 -0.241 -0.333 -0.175 -0.325 -0.194
(0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.031) (0.031) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032)
Hispanic -0.174 -0.056 -0.113 0.005 -0.146 -0.032 -0.159 -0.044 -0.143 -0.018 -0.186 -0.056 -0.195 -0.040 -0.215 -0.070
(0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033) (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) (0.036) (0.035) (0.038) (0.036) (0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.037)
Age - 0.062 - 0.041 - 0.052 - 0.042 - 0.036 - 0.033 - 0.031 - 0.024
- (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.016) - (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.016)
AFQT - 0.096 - 0.079 - 0.097 - 0.082 - 0.098 - 0.093 - 0.130 - 0.119
- (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.015) - (0.016) - (0.017) - (0.017) - (0.017)
AFQT
2 - -0.015 - -0.005 - -0.001 - -0.001 - 0.010 - 0.005 - 0.013 - 0.008
- (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.010) - (0.011) - (0.012) - (0.012) - (0.012)
HGC - 0.044 - 0.040 - 0.043 - 0.047 - 0.046 - 0.065 - 0.066 - 0.066
- (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.007) - (0.006)
Constant 2.375 0.113 2.372 0.668 2.404 0.281 2.423 0.501 2.458 0.679 2.533 0.540 2.589 0.549 2.629 0.802
(0.017) (0.390) (0.017) (0.410) (0.017) (0.422) (0.017) (0.431) (0.018) (0.488) (0.019) (0.531) (0.020) (0.586) (0.020) (0.608)
N 1538 1504 1553 1513 1536 1503 1542 1504 1522 1485 1554 1519 1494 1462 1438 1404
Year:
I II I II I II I II I II I II I II I II
Black -0.172 -0.081 -0.200 -0.101 -0.201 -0.131 -0.167 -0.073 -0.148 -0.069 -0.147 -0.035 -0.201 -0.088 -0.200 -0.086
(0.031) (0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.033) (0.034) (0.032) (0.036) (0.034)
Hispanic -0.003 0.120 -0.017 0.111 -0.059 0.073 0.009 0.139 -0.018 0.118 -0.006 0.137 -0.069 0.091 -0.064 0.096
(0.035) (0.033) (0.037) (0.036) (0.036) (0.033) (0.039) (0.037) (0.040) (0.038) (0.041) (0.037) (0.039) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038)
Age - 0.013 - 0.036 - 0.013 - 0.014 - 0.006 - -0.009 - 0.013 - -0.017
- (0.015) - (0.016) - (0.015) - (0.017) - (0.017) - (0.017) - (0.017) - (0.017)
AFQT - 0.106 - 0.113 - 0.094 - 0.121 - 0.111 - 0.130 - 0.119 - 0.127
- (0.017) - (0.019) - (0.017) - (0.019) - (0.020) - (0.019) - (0.019) - (0.020)
AFQT
2 - -0.001 - -0.002 - -0.007 - -0.009 - -0.026 - 0.003 - 0.004 - -0.007
- (0.013) - (0.014) - (0.013) - (0.014) - (0.015) - (0.014) - (0.014) - (0.014)
HGC - 0.063 - 0.064 - 0.075 - 0.075 - 0.081 - 0.081 - 0.076 - 0.073
- (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.007) - (0.007) - (0.006) - (0.006) - (0.006)
Constant 2.141 0.913 2.175 0.270 2.193 0.784 2.174 0.720 2.218 0.932 2.246 1.397 2.311 0.802 2.339 1.928
(0.019) (0.413) (0.020) (0.460) (0.019) (0.443) (0.021) (0.508) (0.022) (0.538) (0.022) (0.558) (0.021) (0.583) (0.022) (0.643)
N 1356 1325 1335 1299 1317 1278 1319 1318 1286 1381 1343 1370 1328 1316 1276
1991 1992 1993 1994
1996
1998
Schooling-corrected AFQT is the standardized residual from the regression of the AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables and final level of schooling completed during lifetime. AFQT is a
subset of 4 out of 10 ASVAB tests used by the military for enlistment screening and job assignment. It is the summed score from the word knowledge, paragraph comprehension, mathematics knowledge, and






B. NLSY women born after 1961
Table 5. Change in the Black-White log wage gap induced by controlling for schooling-corrected AFQT and highest grade completed in 1990-2000
1990 1991 1992 1993
A. NLSY men born after 1961Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual
All individuals 0.912 0.734 0.881 0.717 0.934 0.790
(0.232) (0.442) (0.265) (0.451) (0.219) (0.407)
Individuals enrolled in 1997 0.936 0.764 0.915 0.758 0.957 0.819
(0.188) (0.425) (0.217) (0.429) (0.173) (0.385)
Expected Actual Expected Actual Expected Actual
All individuals 0.885 0.734 0.880 0.717 0.930 0.790
(0.255) (0.442) (0.259) (0.451) (0.217) (0.407)
Individuals enrolled in 1997 0.909 0.764 0.911 0.758 0.954 0.819
(0.221) (0.425) (0.220) (0.429) (0.169) (0.385)
1In NLSY97 round 1, respondents who were born in 1980 or 1981 were surveyed on their beliefs about the future. Asked to 
assess the probability that certain events would occur in a specified time period, the respondents were instructed to use a scale 
from 0 (impossible) to 100 (certain). In the expected columns we report the percentage of each race group that expects to be 
enrolled in the next year. In the actual columns we report the percentage of each race group that is actually enrolled in that year. 
Expectations were measured at age 17-18.
Table 6b.   Parental expectations
1 about youth school enrollment in 1998, NLSY79 males
Table 6a.   Juvenile expectations
1 about school enrollment in 1998, NLSY97 males
Black Hispanic White
Black Hispanic White
1In round 1, parents of NLSY97 respondents who were born in 1980 or 1981 were surveyed on their beliefs about their
children’s future. Asked to assess the probability that certain events would occur in a specified time period, the respondents were
instructed to use a scale from 0 (impossible) to 100 (certain). In the expected columns we report the percentage of each race
group that expects to its children to be enrolled in the next year. In the actual columns we report the percentage of each race







































Hispanic Black White Hispanic Black White
The height of the bar is produced by dividing the number of people who report falling in a particular
educationalal  cell by the total number of people in their race−sex group.
CNLSY79
Figure 10A
Child’s Own Expected Educational Level at Age 10 
 by Race and Sex
Drop Out High School Graduate








































Hispanic Black White Hispanic Black White
The height of the bar is produced by dividing the number of people who report falling in a particular
educationalal  cell by the total number of people in their race−sex group.
CNLSY79
Figure 10B
Mother’s Expected Educational Level For the Child at Age 6 
 by Race and Sex
Drop Out High School Graduate




























4−5 6−7 8−9 10−11 12−13 14
Child’s Age
White Males Black Males Hispanic Males
Mothers were asked 28 age−specific questions about frequency, range and type of specific behavior problems that
children age four and over may have exhibited in the previous three months. Factor analysis was used to determine
six clusters of questions. This test is one such cluster. The responses for each cluster were dichotomized and summed
to produce a raw score. The percentile score was then calculated separately for each sex at each age from the raw score
A higher percentile score indicates a higher incidence of problems.
CNLSY79 Males
Figure 115
Average Percentile Antisocial Behavior Score





























4−5 6−7 8−9 10−11 12−13 14
Child’s Age
Hispanic Black White
Adjusted by permanent family income, mother’s education and age−corrected AFQT, and home score.
Adjusted indicates that we equalized the family background characteristics across all race groups by setting them at
the mean to purge the effect of family environment disparities. Permanent income is constructed by taking the average
of annual family income discounted to child’s age 0 using a 10% discount rate. Age−corrected AFQT is the standardized
residual from the regression of the raw AFQT score on age at the time of the test dummy variables. Home score is an
index of quality of the child’s home environment.
CNLSY79 Males
Figure 12
Adjusted Percentile Antisocial Behavior Score By Race and Age Group   
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